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Cognitive Context and Arguments from
Ontologies for Learning
Christiana PANAYIOTOU a,1, Brandon BENNETT a
a School of Computing, University of Leeds, LS2 ,Leeds,UK
Abstract. The deployment of learning resources on the web by different experts
has resulted in the accessibility of multiple viewpoints about the same topics. In
this work we assume that learning resources are underpinned by ontologies. Differ-
ent formalizations of domains may result from different contexts, different use of
terminology, incomplete knowledge or conflicting knowledge. We define the notion
of cognitive learning context which describes the cognitive context of an agent
who refers to multiple and possibly inconsistent ontologies to determine the truth
of a proposition. In particular we describe the cognitive states of ambiguity and in-
consistency resulting from incomplete and conflicting ontologies respectively. Con-
flicts between ontologies can be identified through the derivation of conflicting ar-
guments about a particular point of view. Arguments can be used to detect inconsis-
tencies between ontologies. They can also be used in a dialogue between a human
learner and a software tutor in order to enable the learner to justify her views and
detect inconsistencies between her beliefs and the tutor’s own. Two types of argu-
ments are discussed, namely: arguments inferred directly from taxonomic relations
between concepts, and arguments about the necessary and jointly sufficient features
that define concepts.
Keywords. ontologies, reasoning, formal comparison between ontologies
Introduction
Learning resources are becoming increasingly available on the web. As a result a learner
may have access to multiple resources about a single topic. We assume that each learning
resource is underpinned by an ontology. Ontologies of the same domain may be repre-
sented at various degrees of abstraction and granularity. They may also represent knowl-
edge at different degrees of completeness. Reasons can be traced to different points of
view and experience of the experts that derive them. The learner may not be able to de-
termine whether discrepancies in ontologies arise due to incompleteness of knowledge,
due to disagreement between ontologies, or due to differences in the perspectives giv-
ing rise to different viewpoints. Our long term objective is to develop a computational
framework of an agent capable of handling viewpoint discrepancies in the ontologies of
learning resources and to enable a learner to engage in a dialogue with the software tutor
to clarify differences of her own viewpoints with the viewpoints of learning resources.
1Corresponding Authors: Christiana Panayiotou, Dr. Brandon Bennett, School of Computing, University of
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This paper focuses on the formalization of three important aspects of this framework,
described below.
Firstly we formalize two cognitive states, namely the cognitive states of ambiguity
and inconsistency that enable us to plan the interaction between a human learner and the
software agent. In order to address the problem of cognitive ambiguity and confusion of
learners, we allow resources with conflicting or different information to be part of the
same cognitive context. We assume that the context is related to the goal of the learning
activity (referred to as the focus of the learning activity) rather than on the compatibility
of the resources referred to by the context. As a consequence, the context may involve
multiple domains, if multiple domain points of view are relevant to the learning topic. For
example, the topic may involve the points of view of multiple domains like psychology,
social science and anthropology in order to form a particular position.
Secondly, we propose a proof-theoretic approach to the automatic derivation of ar-
guments from ontologies. To resolve cognitive confusion arising from inconsistencies in
ontologies, we suggest the use of reasoning via argumentation. A theorem prover can
be used to check consistency of arguments of one ontology with ontologies of other re-
sources when arguments are translated into an appropriate form. It can also be used in
human computer interaction to enable the learner and the tutor to clarify their positions
about a topic via arguments. The software agent can also verify the validity (soundness)
of a learner’s argument from its form. We formalize two different types of arguments that
are useful in learning. These are syllogistic arguments derived from hierarchical relations
in ontologies and arguments about necessary and jointly sufficient features of concepts.
Thirdly, we suggest a set of utterances that enable a learner and a tutor to exchange
arguments in a human computer interaction and check the validity of the learner’s argu-
ments. In order to facilitate human-computer interaction, utterances between agents are
represented internally as dialogue moves. Each move may include an ontological state-
ment of a particular resource and may cause a change on the beliefs (ontologies) of the
participants of the dialogue. Also as the focus of the interaction may change during the
dialogue, the set of ontologies associated with the cognitive learning context may change
as well. In order to capture this dynamic behavior of the system we make the learning
context of the participants and the belief stores of the participants of the dialogue situa-
tion depended and we formalize changes via the use of situation calculus. Our third ob-
jective in this paper is to formalize a set of moves that enable the exchange of arguments
inferred from particular ontologies.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related work on
the definition of context and on paraconsistent logics. The notions of cognitive learning
context, cognitive ambiguity and cognitive inconsistency are discussed in this section. In
section 3 we discuss syllogistic arguments and arguments related to the necessary and
jointly sufficient properties of concepts. Section 4 shows an example of an interaction of a
learner with the software agent in order to discuss differences in ontologies of underlying
resources. Finally section 5 outlines the main issues discussed in this paper and briefly
describes future research plans.
1. Related Work
1.1. Mental Spaces
Notable approaches to modeling cognitive context can be found in the linguistics liter-
ature. We note the works of Fauconnier [1] and Dinsmore[2]. Fauconnier [1] advocated
the idea of mental spaces, which are described as constructs build up in any discourse
according to guidelines provided by linguistic expressions. Objects in mental spaces are
treated as real objects independently of their status in the actual world. Mental spaces
can be built up from many sources and domains. Examples, of sources are: the immedi-
ate experience of the agent, what other people say to us, or what other people think, etc.
They are created by Space Builders which are particular words triggering the creation of
a new space. For example, one such space builder is the word maybe used to build the
possibility mental space. A base mental space is the mental space in which the discourse
takes place. Other important notions introduced in the literature of mental spaces are: the
notion of ambiguity arising from multiple connecting paths between partitioned configu-
rations that yield multiple understandings and the requirement of compatibility between
mental spaces. Fauconnier’s work aimed to address the problems of referential opacity,
the projection of presuppositions, the semantic processing of counterfactuals, etc [3].
Dinsmore [2] complemented Fauconnier’s theory by focusing on the external struc-
ture of mental spaces and attributed semantics to them so that they can be used in rep-
resenting and reasoning about knowledge. He introduced the notion of knowledge par-
titioning as the process of distributing knowledge along different spaces according to
context. The context of a space is a propositional function, e.g. the context of Mary’s
space is a function that takes a proposition p and maps it onto the proposition that Mary
believes p. Dinsmore, showed that inheritance of information from one space in another
is determined by the semantic properties of the respective contexts. Inheritance contexts
constitute a form of secondary contexts, the latter being used to provide a mapping from
the content of one space to the contents of another [3].
Fauconnier’s contribution to modeling mental spaces that correspond to linguistic
forms and words is important for representing the context of utterances and for referenc-
ing objects in different contexts. However, the focus of his investigation was the mental
configurations resulting from english sentences and the construction of meaning during
discourse. Instead, we focus on the epistemic state of agents who have access to incom-
plete resources. Several of the notions used in the representation of knowledge partitions
by Dinsmore point to the artificial intelligence perspective of context representation and
contextual reasoning [4,5,6,7]. Although they provide a significant insight to the prob-
lem of context representation and reasoning, their models do not capture the notions of
incompleteness and inconsistency between different resources.
1.2. Local reasoning with multiple epistemic alternatives
The Local Model Semantics [8] provide a foundation for reasoning with contexts which
is based on two main principles: the principle of locality and the principle of compati-
bility. The first states that reasoning requires only a part of what is potentially available
[8]. The principle of compatibility states that there is compatibility among the kinds of
reasoning performed in different contexts [8] and associates different contexts with some
meaningful relation of subsets of their local models. Our notion of cognitive context is
different from the above as it may include incompatible resources that are related to the
reasoning task of the learning activity. However, the principle of locality and the assump-
tion that the available information may be incomplete affect the way learners interpret
information and are used to model the cognitive state of the learner.
Several logics addressed the problem of inconsistency in logic theories and knowl-
edge bases. To name but a few, paraconsistent logics, many-valued logics and modal log-
ics have been developed to tackle inconsistency. Among those, notable uses of paracon-
sistent and possible world semantics to model mental models and epistemic states are the
works of [9] and [10]. Fagin and Halpern [9] consider each agent as a society of minds
rather than a single mind. Inspired by the work of Fagin and Halpern [9], Lokhorst [11]
developed a (two-valued) local reasoning model of split-patients as a structure:
M = 〈W,w0,Ψ, S,R, V 〉 (1)
where W denotes a set of possible worlds, w0 the actual world, Ψ a set of minds (each
mind behaves independently of the other), S a function S : W → ℘(Ψ) (S maps a
world to the set of minds in which this world is possible) and R is a function from
Ψ into W ×W . The above model had some utility in creating our cognitive learning
context for the following reason. Suppose that we represent each mind in Ψ above, as a
(local) ontology with its own signature. Then S would associate each (separate) ontology
with the set of worlds with which this ontology is compatible. This would be useful if
the learner was unable to compare information from different ontologies. Hence lack of
comparison would mean lack of confusion caused from differences between ontologies.
But this differs from the problem we are trying to solve. Therefore the above model
cannot be applied as it is to model the cognitive learning context of a learner.
The paraconsistent logic LEI is based on the idea of multiple observers having di-
verging views about a certain state of affairs. It extends classical logic with the formula
p? where p? is satisfied whenever p holds in all plausible worlds. Unlike the traditional
modal logics approach to modeling necessity and possibility, the LEI employs two sat-
isfaction relations: the credulous and the skeptical approach. Martins et al. [10] provided
a multiple world semantics to the above idea where each plausible world corresponds to
a particular view of the world. The above approach is useful in comparing beliefs derived
by the credulous vs. skeptical entailment relation which is different from the focus of this
paper. In this paper we assume that each agent combines two levels of reasoning: a lo-
cal reasoning level which considers each ontology locally and the meta-epistemic level,
at which the agent compares inferences drawn locally in each ontology and determines
compatibility with other ontologies.
2. Cognitive Context, Incompleteness and Inconsistency
We illustrate the notion of incompleteness and inconsistency in resources via the use of
an example. Then we introduce our proposed definitions for the concepts of cognitive
context, ambiguity due to incompleteness and inconsistency using the possible world
semantics.
2.1. Example
A learner L comes across a professional training programming course on visual basic.
This resource states that visual Basic is an object-oriented language. The learner believes
that an object-oriented language needs to satisfy the property of encapsulation but she
does not know whether visual basic has this property. In addition the online notes of
her class instructor show visual basic as an example of a non ’object oriented language’
because it does not have the property of inheritance.
The learner in this example makes use of three resources - her own background
knowledge about object oriented languages, the instructor’s online notes and the pro-
fessional programming course site. All of them are part of the cognitive context of the
learner. Two of these resources, namely the instructor’s notes and the professional pro-
gramming course are inconsistent. Although the learner’s background knowledge is not
directly inconsistent with the online resources, it is not reinforced by them either. Since
both online resources are assumed to be expert resources the learner does not know how
to interpret lack of evidence supporting her own knowledge. Do the experts possess par-
tial knowledge about significant concepts of the domain? Should relevant information
from both resources be integrated or should one be dropped for another? Since there is
no definite answer for all situations and more than one interpretations of the situation are
possible, we interpret the epistemic state resulting from this situation as ambiguous. In
the following paragraphs of this section we formalize the notions referred to in the above
example. In this paper we represent each learning resource via its underlying ontology.
So a definition of ontology is relevant.
2.2. Ontology
In this project we use OWL-DL as an ontology representation language because it is a
decidable fragment of description logic and expressive enough to satisfy our need for the
representation of concepts, roles and hierarchies that give rise to the type of arguments
formalized in this work. An Ontology in this paper is described as a structure 〈T,A〉
where T denotes a DL TBox (i.e. a set of terminological) axioms and A denotes a DL
ABox (i.e. a set of grounded assertions). Each ontology has its own signature consisting
of a disjoint set of relation names, concept names and constant names of individuals.
We denote the signature of an OWL ontology Oi by Sig(Oi) ≡ R ∪ C ∪ N , where R
denotes the relation names, C the concept names andN the set of individual names. The
interpretation Ii of the Sig(Oi) is the structure 〈Di, ·Ii〉 where Di is the domain of the
ontology and ·Ii is the interpretation function such that: CIi ⊆ Di, RIi ⊆ Din (in OWL
is Di ×Di).
2.3. Cognitive Learning Context
The model of the local reasoning learning context of a learner L is defined as a structure
Υsit ≡ 〈O,W, δ, η, s〉 (2)
where O = {O′1, . . . O
′
n} and O
′
i ≡ 〈T
′
i , A
′
i〉 represents the part of each ontology Oi ≡
〈Ti, Ai〉 referenced that is relevant to the focus, η, of the learning activity, i.e. T ′i ⊆ Ti
and A′i ⊆ Ai . Each ontology Oi has a standard interpretation Ii = 〈∆i, ·Ii〉. Let T =
T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tn and A = A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An. Let I∗i be an extension (interpretation) of Ii on
T ∪ A. We define W to be the set of interpretations of T ∪ A, i.e. W = {I∗i }i=1...n
and δ to be an accessibility relation associating each O′i ∈ O in each situation to a set of
possible epistemic alternatives: δ : O → ℘(W ). η is a proposition.
Note that there may not be any interpretation satisfying all ontologies. If we assume
that ontologies are locally consistent then there is at least one interpretation satisfying
each ontology in O. For example, if A⊑B ∈ Ti and A⊑C ∈ Tj but A⊑C 6∈ Ti then
there exist two subsets of possible worlds in W , W1 and W2 say, such that W1 supports
both A⊑B and A⊑C and W2 supportsA⊑B but not A⊑C. Also, for each conflicting
set of formulae A ⊑ B ∈ Ti and A ⊑ ¬B ∈ Tj for i 6= j, there is at least one possible
world w ∈ W which assigns true to one formula and false to the other. Using the above
definition of the cognitive state of a learner, we are now able to discuss the cognitive
states of ambiguity and inconsistency.
2.4. Cognitive Ambiguity due to Incompleteness
Intuitively, a learner reaches a cognitive state of ambiguity whenever she has access to
more than one plausible epistemic alternatives and the learner is unable to choose one.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ambiguity as: wavering of opinion, hesitation,
doubt, uncertainty, as to one’s course, or, capable of being understood in two or more
ways, or, doubtful, questionable, indistinct, obscure, not clearly defined and lastly, ad-
mitting more than one interpretation or explanation; of double meaning or several pos-
sible meanings (in [12]). The notion of ambiguity in our case refers to the interpretation
of incompleteness of information contained in learning resources by the learner. We as-
sume that a learner becomes aware of the incompleteness of a learning resource when
she compares it with her background knowledge or with another resource.
2.4.1. Definition of Cognitive Ambiguity
Assume a resource R1 and δ(R1) = WR1 ⊆ W i.e. R1 is compatible with a subset of
possible worlds WR1 of W . Then, assume that the agent has access to another resource
R2 which is compatible withWR2 ⊆ W . If there exist w1, w2 ∈ W where w1 ∈ WR1
and w2 ∈ WR2 such that w1 supports η and w2 supports ¬η then we say that agent A is
ambiguous with respect to η and we denote this as: UA(η).
2.4.2. Vocabulary Assumption
The type of ambiguity we address here is the ambiguity that results from incomplete-
ness of knowledge rather than the lexical vocabulary used by each resource. The set of
resources relevant to the subject of the learning activity may change in each situation
according to the focus of the learning activity. To be able to determine incompleteness
and inconsistency between ontologies we need to make some assumptions regarding the
vocabularies of the ontologies that form part of the cognitive context. Assume a unified
signature Σ which consists of the union of all the signatures Sig(O′i) (defined as above).
To simplify matters, we assume that any two identical non-logical symbols of two re-
sources R1 and R2 are considered the same unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Further, where we have explicit default mappings between terms we may apply default
inference rules to draw conclusions between multiple ontologies as follows:
[R1 : C(x)] : [R2 : C(x)] ↔ [R1 : C(x)]
[R2 : C(x)]
(3)
Default rule 3 states that if there is no inference inconsistent to [R2 : C(x)]↔ [R1 :
C(x)] in R2 then R2 : C(x) can be asserted in R2. A similar default inference rule is
used for relations between concepts and names of individuals.
[R1 : R(x, y)] : [R2 : R(x, y)] ↔ [R1 : R(x, y)]
[R2 : R(x, y)]
(4)
The biconditional used in the inference rules aims to maintain consistency with map-
pings of terms between different vocabularies. If the conclusion of the default rule that
refers to an assertion about a resource is not inconsistent with the assertions of the re-
source and is not already in the ontology of the resource, then the resource is incomplete.
As an example, of a case where direct equivalences of assumptions can be used to
assert new facts about different resources consider two people (P1 and P2 say) viewing
a scene from opposite sites then P1 : right(P1, x) ↔ P2 : left(P2, x) for some object
x. Further assume that the constrain Pi : right(P1, x)→¬Pj : left(P2, x) where i 6= j
and i, j ∈ {1, 2} holds for each person. Then obviously, it is inconsistent to assume that
P1 : right(P1, x)↔P2 : right(P2, x). Note that the intended meaning of the notions of
Pi : right(Pi, X) and Pi : left(Pi, X) for each i ∈ {1, 2} is independent of the situation
of Pi. However the actual assignment of terms is dependent on their situation.
2.5. Cognitive Inconsistency (Confusion)
Intuitively, we assume that cognitive inconsistency arises when in the actual world of the
learner, information about a topic is conflicting. It is different from cognitive ambiguity
in that cognitive ambiguity appears as a consequence of possible epistemic alternatives
(not necessarily inconsistent) due to lack of knowledge. We model this by the derivation
of refuting arguments relating to the focus of the learning activity.
2.5.1. Definition of Inconsistency
Assume a resource R1 and δ(R1) = WR1 ⊆ W . Then, assume that either δ(R2) =
WR2 ⊆ W for some resource R2 (or that δ(BK) = WRBK ⊆ W where BK is the
background knowledge of the agent). If for any two w1, w2 ∈ W such that w1 ∈ WR1
and w2 ∈ WR2 (or w2 ∈ WRBK ) we have that w1 supports η and w2 supports ¬η then
we say that agent A is inconsistent with respect to η and we denote this as: IncA(η).
The use of argumentation to identify and justify claims that may be conflicting each
other is not only important for the recognition of the cognitive state of the learner but also
for the recognition of differences or inconsistencies in ontologies automatically. In the
next section we discuss the formalization of two types of arguments that can be inferred
from ontologies, namely syllogistic and arguments about necessary and jointly sufficient
features associated to the definition of concepts.
3. Syllogistic Arguments and Ontological Taxonomic Relations.
An Ontology may include one or more hierarchies of concepts that can be used to infer
categorical statements.
3.1. Concept hierarchy
A concept hierarchy is a structure H = 〈CH, RH〉 where CH is a set of concepts, st.
CH ⊆ C of the ontology O, and RH = {Disjoint, SubclassOf, Union, Intersects}
and every concept in CH is associated with another concept via a relation in RH. OWL-
DL provides for all of relations in RH and therefore a hierarchy can be represented in
it. We are interested in those interpretations of a hierarchy that satisfy all the taxonomic
relations within the hierarchy. A model, MH of H is an interpretation I of H where all
the taxonomic relations in RH are satisfied. Obviously, MH is a sub-model of M and
therefore any entailment of MH is an entailment of M.
3.2. Categorical statements
Generalized statements the form: Every X is a Y or Every X has the property of Y can be
inferred from taxonomic hierarchies and can be combined to form syllogistic arguments.
These statements are referred to as categorical statements. A syllogism [13] is a particu-
lar type of argument that has two premises and a single conclusion and all statements in
it are categorical propositions.
3.2.1. Individuals
In ontologies, a distinction is made between individuals and classes. In the consequent
we argue that the set equations that can be used to represent ontological primitives can
be translated to propositional logic formulae that can be used to test validity of argu-
ments. To simplify computation and to prove whether an individual belongs to a class
(or a refutation that an individual belongs to a class) we represent individuals as singular
sets consisting of that individual only. In this way we treat individuals as classes during
inference. An ontology may include one or more hierarchies of concepts that can be used
to infer syllogisms.
3.2.2. Syllogisms
Syllogisms form a particular type of arguments that are constructed from generalized
statements (categorical statements). There are four basic categorical statements which
can be combined to produce 64 patterns of Syllogistic Arguments. These are shown
below together with the corresponding ontological primitives:
Categorical Statement Ontological Primitive
Every S is a P SubclassOf(S, P)
No S is a P SubclassOf( S, ComplementOf(P))
Some S is a P Intersects(S, P)
Some S is not P Intersects(S, ComplementOf(P))
However, only 27 of them are valid syllogisms. This suggests the need to check
the validity of syllogisms constructed from ontologies and exchanged during interaction
with the learner.
3.3. Necessary and Sufficiency Conditions Arguments.
The classical view of the representation of concepts states that the features representing
a concept are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to define a concept. In line with the
above view we propose the following definitions for the necessary and jointly sufficient
features representing a concept.
3.3.1. Necessary Features for the Representation of a Concept
Intuitively, a feature φ is singly necessary for the definition of C if and only if existence
of C implies existence of φ. Assume a feature φ. We define a set Φ consisting of all
individuals of the domain which have property φ (e.g. via the onProperty restriction in
OWL-DL ). Then, φ is a necessary property for the representation of concept C if and
only if CI ⊆ Φ. An example of a refutal to the assumption that φ is a necessary feature
for C is the derivation of an individual that belongs to C and to a class disjoint with Φ.
3.3.2. Jointly Sufficient Features for the Representation of a Concept
Let {Φ1, . . . ,Φn} represent the set of concepts corresponding to features φ1, ..., φn re-
spectively. Then φ1, ..., φn are jointly sufficient for the representation of concept C if
and only if {Φ1∩, . . . ,∩Φn} ⊆ CI . An example of a refutal (i.e. an attacking argument)
to the above assumption would be the existence of an individual that has these proper-
ties but does not belong to C. Conflicting arguments about these notions can be used to
differentiate concept definitions between different ontologies.
3.4. Bennett’s theory
Bennett [14] proved that set equations can be translated to propositional logic formulae
that can be tested for their validity with a Gentzen theorem prover. Although his theory
was intended primarily for reasoning with mereological relations it is applicable in our
case for reasoning with the type of arguments described above. This is because the mere-
ological relations being represented using this theory closely resemble the set-theoretic
semantics attributed to the ontological primitives describing associations between con-
cepts in ontologies. Bennett [14] proves that the mereological equations with set theoretic
semantics can be translated to equivalent universal equations which can in turn be con-
verted to propositional logic formulae that can be validated with a simple Gentzen the-
orem prover. Based on Bennett’s classical entailment correspondence theorem we were
able via a small adaptation to derive a taxonomic entailment correspondence theorem
which is very similar to the theorem described above but concerns hierarchical relations.
This is stated below:
3.4.1. Taxonomic entailment correspondence theorem
MH |= φ if and only if MC+ |= τ = U (5)
where U is the universe of discourse. Unintended models of the theory are excluded by
the use of (entailment) constraints. It therefore follows that satisfaction of these con-
straints forms a refutal against the association of concepts being modeled. To avoid tech-
nical details which are beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to say that since each
categorical statement in a syllogistic argument can be translated to propositional form,
then the validity of the syllogistic argument can be tested against a propositional theorem
prover.
3.5. Conflicts between arguments
Intuitively, a set of arguments consists of a minimal set of premises (here categorical
statements) used in the derivation of a claim. In this paper we focus on strict arguments
that are inferred via the classical entailment relation. Two arguments conflict with each
other (attack) if either (i) the claim of one argument is inconsistent with the claim of the
other argument (i.e. rebutal [15]) or (ii) the claim of one argument is inconsistent with
one of the other premises of the other argument (i.e. undercutting [15]) or (iii) one argu-
ment’s premises are inconsistent with the other argument’s premises. Since a syllogism is
defined entirely in terms of categorical expressions then two syllogistic arguments con-
flict each other if any expression in one argument is inconsistent with an expression in
the other argument.
4. Human Computer Interaction Using Arguments
In this section we extend the example given in section 1.2 to include an interaction be-
tween a human learner and a software agent to clarify differences in ontologies.
4.1. Extended Example
Scenario as above but extended to show the situation where a learner initiates a dialogue
with the agent to discuss the differences in conceptualizations (in this paper we make the
simplifying assumption that ontologies are used to represent conceptualizations). The
software agent uses the ontology of the resource to provide tutoring support to the learn-
ers. The dialogue proceeds as follows:
(1) L: Let us Discuss the statement in Resource: URI1: Visual Basic is an Object Oriented Language?
(2) A: Does the resource provide a justification why Visual Basic is an Object Oriented Language?
(3) L: The resource URI1 states that visual basic is an object oriented language because visual basic
contains Objects.
In line (1) above the learner is confused about the truth of a statement. The focus of the dialogue is ’visual
basic is an object oriented language’. The agent responds to the request of the learner to discuss this statement
by trying to find out whether the resource provides a justification (i.e. whether the statement is a claim of an
argument) or whether the statement is an assertion. To find out whether the learner agrees with the viewpoint
of the resource, the software agent A explores the viewpoint of the learner. The interaction continues with:
(4) A: So do you agree that visual basic includes objects?
(5) L: Yes..I agree that visual basic includes objects
(6) A: Do you agree that a programming language is object oriented language because it contains objects?
(7) L: I disagree with this.
(8) A: OK, do you agree that contains objects is a necessary property of object oriented language?
(9) L: Yes.
During lines (4)− (9) the agent collects information about the learner. The learner may
disagree with the argument given by the resource in the following ways: (i) either dis-
agrees that ’visual basic contains objects’ or (ii) disagrees that the property ’contains
objects’ is necessary to infer that visual basic is object oriented language, or (iii) dis-
agrees that ’contains objects’ is sufficient to infer that visual basic is object an oriented
language. In lines (4)− (5) the agent determines whether the learner believes that visual
basic has property ’contains objects’. In lines (6)− (7) the agent determines whether the
learner believes that ’contains objects’ is a necessary and sufficient property of ’object
oriented language’ (i.e. whether it defines the concept object oriented language). In lines
(8)−(9) the agent determines whether the learner believes that property contains objects
is necessary for the concept object oriented language. After this interaction the agent
knows that although the learner believes that ’contains objects’ is a necessary property
of ’object oriented language’, it is not sufficient to define the concept of ’object oriented
language’.
(10) A: What other property is a necessary property of object oriented language?
(11) L: Encapsulation is a necessary property of Object oriented language.
(12) A: So, you think that IF a programming language contains objects AND has the property of encap-
sulation then it is an object oriented language?
(13) L: Yes, that’s it!
(14) A: Therefore, you think that IF visual basic has the property of encapsulation THEN visual basic is
an object oriented Language
(15) L: Yes.
During the lines (10)− (15) the agent is able to obtain the learner’s definition of object
oriented language and is able to explain her confusion. In this case, confusion arises due
to inconsistency between the knowledge of the resource and the learner. Such confusion
can arise due to directly conflicting arguments.
4.2. Dialogue Moves
Interaction between the learner and the tutor is enabled via a set of statement openers and
templates which provide the structure of communication and constrain the scope of in-
teraction. The parts that the user is required to complete represent ontological statements
which correspond to OWL-DL statements. Utterances are parsed internally as moves. A
dialogue move is a tuple of the form:
DM(id, Speaker,Move, φ) (6)
where id is the identifier of the move, Speaker is the utterer, Move is a performative verb
representing the locution being uttered, and φ is an ontology statement.
4.3. Situation Calculus Approach to Formalizing Moves
A situation calculus [16,17,18] approach to modeling moves and changes in the commit-
ment stores of the participants of the dialog, is followed. A similar approach is advocated
by Brewka in [19]. Each move in our framework is formalized in terms of its effect on
the beliefs of the participants and advances the existing situation to the next situation.
Below we illustrate the formalization of a set of effect rules from moves performed by
the learner. It is important to note that both the learner and the tutor are allowed to dis-
agree and challenge each other’s opinion. A complete list of the effect rules is beyond
the scope of this paper.
4.3.1. The learner initiates the discussion
commit(learner, {∗φ}, do(DM(id, learner, iDiscuss, φ), s0)) where ∗φ = ¬Belφ∧
¬Bel¬(φ).
i.e. the learner commits to not knowing whether φ after it initiates the discussion.
commit(learner, {∗φ,Ri :φ}, do(DM(id, learner, iDiscuss,Ri :φ), s0))
i.e. the learner commits that Ri :φ after it initiates the discussion for Ri :φ.
4.3.2. The learner clarifies a statement asked to clarify by the tutor
commit(learner,Ri :ψ, do(DM(id, learner, iClarify,Ri :φbecauseψ), do(a, s))←
a = do(DM(id, tutor, qClarify, φ) ∧ commit(learner,Ri :φ, s)).
i.e. the learner is committed that Ri :ψ is the justification (in our case sufficient condi-
tion) provided for Ri :φ.
4.3.3. The learner justifies a statement challenged or questioned to clarify by the tutor
commit(learner, φbecauseψ, do(DM(id, learner, iJustify,becauseψ), do(a, s)))←
commit(learner, φ, s)∧(a = DM(id, tutor, qClarify, φ)∨(a = DM(id, tutor, qChallenge, φ))).
i.e. the learner provides a justification (sufficiency condition) for believing φ.
4.3.4. Either of the agents disagrees a statement
commit(S,¬φ, do(DM(id, S, iDisagree, φ), do(a, s))) ← commit(S˙, φ, s) ∨ a =
DM(id, S˙, qInquire1, φ).
i.e. agent S disagrees that φ if the other participant, S˙ have already committed to φ A
full list of moves with their corresponding natural language expression is provided in the
table below.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we introduced the notion of cognitive learning context that refers to multi-
ple and possibly inconsistent ontologies. Differences in ontologies can be identified via
arguments that can be inferred from relevant subsets of terminological axioms and as-
sertions of ontologies referred to by the cognitive context. We show that syllogistic ar-
guments follow naturally from ontological primitives and we represent arguments about
the necessary and jointly sufficient properties of concepts. We also illustrated via the
use of an example a dialogue where the learner interacts with the software tutor in or-
der to clarify differences in ontologies via the use of justifications provided in support
of claims made either by the learner or the learning resources accessible to the learner.
Issues like alignment of vocabularies of different ontologies are addressed via default
inference rules. In the near future we plan to elaborate on the formalization of arguments
and define precisely the associations between arguments and their relevance to different
situations. Additionally we plan to work on dialogue management taking into consider-
ation the cognitive state of the learner in each situation.
Speech Act Natural Language Expression
With inform (super)type:
The discuss move
DM(id, l, iDiscuss∗, ist(URL, φ)) Let us discuss statement φ in URL.
The clarify move
DM(id, l, iClarify, ist(URL, {ψ, ψ ⇒ φ})) The resource with URI = URL states that φ holds because
ψ holds
The justify moves
DM(id, l, iJustify, φ) Because φ.
DM(id, t, iJustifyφ) (ψ holds) Because φ.
DM(id, l, iJustify, ψ) Because ψ and ψ ⇒ φ.
The agree moves
DM(id, l, iAgree, φ) Yes, I agree that φ.
DM(id, t, iAgree, φ) Yes, I agree that φ.
The disagree moves
DM(id, l, iDisagree, φ) I disagree that φ.
DM(id, t, iDisagree, φ) I disagree that φ.
DM(id, l, iDisagree, _) I disagree with the previous statement.
DM(id, t, iDisagree, _) I disagree with this statement.
DM(id, l, iDisagree, ψ) I disagree because ψ.
DM(id, l, iDisagree, ψ ⇒ φ) I disagree because ψ implies φ.
The claim moves
DM(id, l, iClaim, φ) I think that φ.
DM(id, l, iClaim, ψ ⇒ φ) I think that if ψ then φ.
The concede moves
DM(id, S, iConcede, φ) Yes, I think that φ.
With Question (super)type:
The clarify move
DM(id, l, qClarify, ?ψ : ist(URI, ψ ⇒ φ)) What is the explanation given in resource with
Resourceuri = URI for φ?
The inquire moves
DM(id, t, qInquire1, φ) Do you think that φ?
DM(id, t, qInquire1, ψ ⇒ φ) Do you think that if ψ then φ ?
< id, t, qInquire, φ > What is φ?
The challenge moves
DM(id, t, qChallenge, φ) Why do you think that φ?
DM(id, t, qChallenge,ψ ⇒ φ) Why do you think that ψ implies φ? (Here we assume that ψ
is given as a reason, the rule of which is not clear)
Table 1. l stands for the learner, t stands for the tutor, φ is a statement in the domain language, URL is the
uri of the external resource and ist(URL, φ) means that φ is true in resource with URI = URL.
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